Introduction
All the Personal Property Security Acts clearly state that an unperfected security interest is ineffective against the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy.
1 However, they are less clear about the status of an unperfected security interest in CCAA 2 proceedings, BIA 3 commercial and consumer proposal proceedings and receiverships. In Ontario, the governing provision is OPPSA, s.20(1)(b), which provides as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (3), until perfected, a security interest, . . .
(b) in collateral is not effective against a person who represents the creditors of the debtor, including an assignee for the benefit of creditors and a trustee in bankruptcy.
This replaces an earlier provision, which referred to a person "who represents the creditors of the debtor as assignee for the benefit of creditors, trustee in bankruptcy or receiver". 4 In the Saskatchewan Personal Property Security Act ("SPPSA"), 5 the governing provision is s.20(2), which provides as follows:
A security interest in collateral is not effective against:
(a) a trustee in bankruptcy if the security interest is unperfected at the date of bankruptcy; or (b) a liquidator appointed pursuant to the Winding-Up [and Restructuring] Act (Canada) if the security interest is unperfected on the day that the winding-up order is made.
The other provincial and territorial PPSAs contain a provision similar to the SPPSA version. There is no reference in the SPPSA version to a person who represents the creditors of the debtor. 6 In Ontario, the statute invites the argument that a CCAA monitor, a BIA proposal trustee or a receiver, as the case may, is a person who represents the creditors of a debtor. By contrast, in the other provinces and territories, the question turns solely on the courts' willingness to read the reference to a trustee in bankruptcy expansively.
The corresponding provision in Revised Article 9 provides that a security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected. 7 "Lien creditor" means: (1) a creditor that has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or the like; (2) an assignee for the benefit of creditors from the time of assignment; (3) a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition; and (4) a receiver in equity from the time of appointment. 8 The reference to a "trustee in bankruptcy" needs to be read in conjunction with s.1107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code which provides that, as a general rule, a debtor in possession in
Chapter 11 proceedings has the same rights and powers and is to perform the same functions and duties as a Chapter 11 trustee. 9 It follows that an unperfected security interest is subordinate not only to a trustee in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, but also to a Chapter 11 trustee and debtor in possession. The strong arm clause in s.544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code leads to the same result. The strong arm clause among other things gives the trustee the rights and powers of a hypothetical lien creditor or unsatisfied execution creditor as of the commencement of the case. Article 9 subordinates an unperfected security interest to the rights of a lien creditor and the strong arm clause puts 6 SPPSA, s.20(1)(d) provides that a security interest in collateral is subordinate to "the interest of a representative of creditors, but only for the purpose of enforcing the rights of [an execution creditor]" (emphasis added). The effect of this provision is "to give only a derivative status to a representative of creditors. The representative can assert only the priority status of actual creditors of the debtor": Ronald CC Cuming, Catherine Walsh and Roderick J. Wood, Personal Property Security Law (Irwin Law Inc., Toronto, 2005) , p.441, n.53. 7 Uniform Commercial Code, s. 9-317(a)(2) (2001). 8 Ibid., s.9-102 (52). 9 Bankruptcy Code, USC, Title 11, s.1107(a).
the trustee in the same position. The strong arm clause applies to cases under all chapters.
10
The Article 9 reference to a "receiver in equity" is obsolete because receiverships have long been "out of fashion" in the United States. 11 Nevertheless, the provision was clearly intended to cover at least court-appointed receivers. 12 Receiverships have recently fallen out of favour in Canada, too, in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Commercial
Credit However, the following discussion proceeds on the assumption that this disaffection will be short-lived and that there will be further case law developments or statutory reforms to allay the concerns TCT Logistics has given rise to. Part 2, below discusses the case law dealing with unperfected security interests in (a) CCAA proceedings, (b) BIA proposal proceedings and (c) receiverships.
Part 3 looks at the policy issues and the need for reform. Part 4 concludes.
The cases (a) CCAA proceedings
In PSINet Ltd (Re), 14 As it happens, the validity of a security interest depends on attachment, not perfection.
While it is true that perfection may affect the status of a security interest vis-à-vis competing claims to the same collateral, 27 failure to perfect does not deprive the secured party of its security interest. So, for example, an unperfected security interest is ineffective against the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. However, that is only because OPPSA, s.20(1)(b) and its inter-provincial counterparts say so. But for these provisions, the holder of an unperfected security interest would retain priority over unsecured creditors in the debtor's bankruptcy. 28 Accordingly, given the court's conclusion in
PSINet that OPPSA, s.20(1)(b) was inapplicable, it became unnecessary for it decide whether the stay should be lifted so that P could perfect its security interest; since OPPSA, s.20(1)(b) did not apply, P's status as a secured creditor in the CCAA proceedings did not depend on perfection and so there was no need for a lifting of the stay. Assume that in PSINet, there had been another security interest in competition with P's and that prior to the expiration of P's registration, P's security interest had priority. In those circumstances, P might want to reperfect following the commencement of the CCAA proceedings so as to preserve its priority over the other security interest.
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However, this was not the situation in PSINet: while there were several security interests in competition with P, it seems they were all purchase money security interests with priority over P's security interest whether it was perfected or not. 30 Likewise, in TRG "the purpose sought by a proposal is continuation of the business carried on by the debtor. While the proposal must present benefits for creditors it is fundamentally a mechanism for the advantage of the 31 Cf PSINet (2002) 30 CBR (4 th ) 226 at para;14 per Farley J.: "while I understand the frustration of the other creditors, I do not think that [P] has put itself into a position whereby it should be prevented from reregistering. However, that is a discretionary decision and it appears to me that it would be just and reasonable to impose certain conditions as a pre-requisite to that permission". 32 (1978) This statement is a non sequitur: the question is whether, as a matter of law, BIA, s.66 (1) assimilates a proposal trustee with a trustee in bankruptcy for all or any purposes, not whether it makes sense to assimilate them as a matter of policy. Furthermore, the policy consideration Anderson J. identifies is open to question, for reasons to be discussed in Part 3(c), below. However, Anderson J.'s conclusion regarding BIA, s.66(1) might still be supported on the ground that the purpose of the provision is simply to incorporate other BIA provisions into the proposals regime by reference and so it cannot be relied on to assimilate a proposal administrator with a trustee in bankruptcy at large.
Mercantile Steel Products was a BIA commercial proposal case. However, the reasoning is equally applicable to consumer proposal administrators. As mentioned earlier, it was held in Hupfer that a consumer proposal administrator is not a trustee in bankruptcy for the purposes of APPSA, s.20(a)(i).
(c) Receivers
There is nothing in either the text or the history of SPPSA, s.20(2) to suggest that it was intended to apply to receivers. The provision applies only to trustees and, as Lo Vecchio J. observed in Brookside, "the words trustee and receiver are not judicially interchangeable". 36 The position is the same in the other provinces except Ontario which involves a more complex analysis. OPPSA, s.20(1)(b) replaces an earlier provision which did refer specifically to receivers. 37 The change originated in a recommendation of the Catzman Committee. 38 The Catzman Committee Report does not explain why the reference to receivers was dropped, but according to Catzman himself, the term "receiver" is a generic one, covering both privately-appointed and court-appointed The facts of the case were that the Royal Bank of Canada, acting as agent for a group of lenders, applied to the court for the appointment of an interim receiver, Pricewaterhouse
Coopers Inc. ("PWC"), over the debtor's assets pursuant to BIA, s.47(1). The appointment order authorized the receiver to carry on the debtor's business and to sell certain assets and it stayed all proceedings against the debtor. Acting pursuant to the appointment order, the receiver sold the assets and the following day, November 15,
2001
, it arranged to change the debtor's name from "The State Group Limited" to "1231640 Ontario Inc.", as required by the terms of the sale agreement. On January 31, 2002, the receiver put the debtor into bankruptcy and PWC was appointed trustee. Some time later, the trustee received a substantial income tax refund payable to the debtor.
The bank and another creditor, St Paul, both held perfected security interests in all the debtor's assets but the bank had priority because it was the first to register. However, since the bank's security interest was perfected at the date of the receivership order, it remained effective in the debtor's bankruptcy even though it had become unperfected in the meantime.
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Ground J. at first instance rejected the argument, ruling that an interim receiver is not a person who represents the creditors of the debtor and that, therefore, OPPSA, s.20 (1)(b) was not engaged until the date of the debtor's bankruptcy, by which time the agent's security interest was unperfected. 43 The Court of Appeal upheld this ruling. Feldman J.A., for the majority, gave the provision an ejusdem generis construction and held that the words "a person who represents the creditors" only catch representatives who are like assignees or trustees. A receiver is different from an assignee or trustee in bankruptcy in two key respects:
"[u]nlike a trustee in bankruptcy and an assignee for the benefit of creditors, a receiver does not obtain the debtor's rights in respect of the collateral and is therefore not in a priority contest with any creditor on behalf of unsecured creditors. Also, in a receivership, the debtor maintains its rights in the collateral. Second, unlike in a bankruptcy, creditors' rights are not frozen on a receivership by statute. Those rights may be stayed by the court order appointing the receiver, but … the stay can be and often is lifted in order to allow a creditor to register to maintain its perfected status".
44
42 St Paul could have made the same argument, but it was against its interests to do so. The reason is that, if the argument had succeeded, both parties would have had enforceable security interests but the bank would have had priority. St Paul was better off arguing that both security interests were ineffective because that way it would end up with a pro rata share of the disputed funds. On this view, OPPSA, s.20(1)(b) would apply to all receivers, including a privately-appointed receiver. However, the history and context of the provision suggest that it was not intended to apply to privately appointed receivers: see text at nn 39 and 40 above and text at n. 79, below. Moreover, a duty to take another party's interests into account is not the same as a duty to act on their behalf. For example, a secured creditor cannot disregard the interests of the debtor or other interested parties when exercising a power of sale: see, e.g., OPPSA, s.63(2). However, this rule does not make the secured creditor a representative of OPPSA, s.30(6) was a significant factor in the court's decision. Section 30(6) provides as follows:
"Where a security interest that is perfected by registration becomes unperfected and is again perfected by registration, the security interest shall be deemed to have been continuously perfected from the time of first perfection except that if a person acquired rights in all or part of the collateral during the period when the security interest was unperfected, the registration shall not be effective as against the person who acquired the rights during such period."
Assume Creditor A applies to the court for appointment of a receiver. Creditor B holds a security interest which was previously perfected by registration but is unperfected at the date of the receivership order. 48 In any event, Creditor B would need to apply to the court for a lifting of the stay so that it could register the new financing statement. In contrast to receiverships, the bankruptcy stay is a statutory one and the court may deny the application. 49 Only in Ontario, though because the corresponding provision to OPPSA, s.30(6) in the other provinces is differently worded: see n.91, below.
Policy considerations (a) Introduction
As currently drafted, the PPSAs do not affect the status of an unperfected security interest relative to unsecured creditors' claims. However, they do make an unperfected security interest subordinate to, or ineffective against: (1) a perfected security interest in the same collateral; (2) an execution creditor who has proceeded to the point of seizure; (3) the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy; and (4) a transferee of the collateral for value. 50 With the exception of item (3), the common thread running through these cases is the importance of protecting the competing claimant's reliance interest and preserving the integrity of the registration system: "public disclosure of the security interest is required to prevent innocent third parties from granting credit to the debtor or otherwise acquiring an interest in the collateral". 51 Failure to perfect makes a security interest effectively undiscoverable and parties such as prospective competing secured creditors, execution creditors and transferees might be prejudiced if their claims were subordinate to a prior security interest they were unaware of at the time they committed themselves to the transaction.
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By contrast, non-perfection typically does not prejudice an unsecured creditor because in advance of execution proceedings an unsecured creditor has no claim on the collateral.
Item (3), above (the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy) appears to be the odd one out. The trustee in bankruptcy is not in the position of an innocent third party: she does not rely on the register for any of her dealings with the debtor and so she is not prejudiced by a secured party's failure to perfect its security interest. representative.
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In summary, the purpose of the rule is "to permit the unsecured creditors to maintain, through the person of the trustee, the same status vis-à-vis secured creditors which they enjoyed prior to the bankruptcy of the debtor". 58 Recall that the corresponding Article 9
provision makes a security interest subordinate to the rights of a person that becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected; "lien creditor" is defined to include a creditor who has acquired a lien on the collateral by attachment, levy, or the like, and also , which effectively gives the debtor's general unsecured creditors the benefit of the rights of a lien creditor, when none of those creditors in fact has actually become a lien creditor by the time of the bankruptcy filing? Remember that the trustee's power of avoidance under s.544(a)(1) does not depend on the existence of any actual lien creditors. If bankruptcy had not intervened, there would have been a priority race under Article 9 (U.C.C. s.9-301(1)(b)) between the holder of the unperfected security interest and all of the unsecured creditors that had not yet obtained a judicial lien. The winner would be the first party to take the required action: if the unperfected secured creditor perfected before any unsecured creditor obtained a judicial lien, the secured creditor would win; but if an unsecured creditor became a lien creditor before the secured party perfected, the lien creditor would win. The bankruptcy filing interrupts that race, before a 'winner' is determined; after filing, the secured party cannot perfect and unsecured creditors cannot obtain judicial liens …Section 544(a)(1) in effect declares that the unresolved race is a "tie": the collateral goes back into the bankruptcy estate, where it will be shared equally by all unsecured creditors and by the formerly secured creditor": op.cit. n.10 at p.339. a trustee in bankruptcy. 59 This drafting makes explicit the connection between execution creditors' rights and the rights of a trustee in bankruptcy and so it reinforces Re Giffen, as does the wording of the strong arm clause in s.544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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In Re Giffen, the court put the case for the rule in fairness terms: when the debtor becomes bankrupt, the execution creditor loses the priority it previously had over unperfected security interests, but this is offset by giving priority to the trustee instead.
However, the justification can also be expressed in economic terms. The thinking goes like this. Bankruptcy creates a common pool problem, which bankruptcy law addresses by substituting a mandatory system of collective debt collection for the individual firstcome, first-served debt collection system that operates outside bankruptcy. proceedings. These effects would presumably be reflected in higher credit costs and reduced availability of credit.
(b) CCAA proceedings
In both PSINet and TRG, it was held that a CCAA monitor is not a person who represents the creditors for the purposes of OPPSA, s.20(1)(b). This conclusion seems right as a matter of statutory interpretation, but it remains to consider whether the outcome is right as a matter of policy. As explained in Part 3(a), above, the reason for making an unperfected security interest ineffective in bankruptcy is to prevent the secured party from using the bankruptcy laws to regain priority over execution creditors.
This consideration does not apply in CCAA proceedings because, while BIA, ss 70 and 73 terminate execution creditors' rights, there are no equivalent provisions in the CCAA.
A CCAA Initial Order will typically stay execution proceedings, but the execution creditor may apply for a lifting of the stay in order to complete the process. It follows that the commencement of CCAA proceedings does not necessarily restore the unperfected secured creditor's priority and it makes no difference to this conclusion whether the CCAA proceedings are in the nature of liquidation proceedings or not.
However, this is not the end of the story because there are other policy considerations in play. In particular, unperfected security interests have the potential to disrupt CCAA plan arrangements. If a security interest is unperfected, plan stakeholders may have no way of finding out about it before they commit themselves to the plan. In some cases, even the debtor itself may be unaware of the security interest; for example, the security interest may depend on provisions in the loan agreement which had escaped the debtor's 62 This should not be taken to mean that it is unlawful or improper for creditors to use the bankruptcy laws as a way of improving their priority position. Rather, the point is that the law should not create such opportunities in the first place. There is a loophole in the law as it presently stands. BIA, s.2.1 provides in part that bankruptcy commences at the date of the granting of the bankruptcy order. The previous rule was that the bankruptcy was deemed to have commenced on the date of the application. The change gives the unperfected secured creditor a window of opportunity to perfect between the date of the application and the date of the order. This is a concern, but it is probably less serious than the loophole identified in Part 3(b), below.
attention or which the debtor did not realize might be construed as giving rise to a security interest. This suggestion is not a fanciful one. A creditor may be anxious to improve its position in CCAA proceedings and the law, as it presently stands, gives the creditor an incentive to go looking in its loan contract for any provision that might at least arguably support a secured claim. In such cases, the debtor may know nothing about the claim until the creditor asks the court for a ruling. 63 This is one reason why the recognition of unperfected security interests in CCAA proceedings is a bad idea: it increases costs by promoting litigation of the kind just described.
Furthermore, there is a risk that the parties may invest time and money in negotiating a plan on the assumption that there are no relevant security interests, only to discover late in the process that the assumption was incorrect. 64 This is precisely what happened in 64 This makes the argument from an ex post perspective. The ex ante version of the argument is that the inability to rely on PPS registry searches might make it difficult at the outset for parties to assess the appropriateness of CCAA proceedings, as opposed to BIA proceedings, a receivership or some other course of action. Again, this point was made by counsel for the debtor in TRG, but to no effect: (2006) to uphold Cisco's claim would either "necessitate a reformulation of the Plan" or trigger the debtor's assignment into bankruptcy. 68 The court in TRG also acknowledged the costs to the debtor and the other creditors as a result of Cisco's late arrival on the scene. As indicated earlier, its solution, following the precedent set in PSINet, was to make the order lifting the stay conditional on Cisco's bearing the "reasonable expenses and costs" associated with its conduct. 69 One problem with this response is that, as discussed in Part 2(a), above, it incorrectly assumes the need for a stay application to facilitate perfection of a security interest in CCAA proceedings. Another problem is that it underestimates the challenge of capturing all the losses resulting from the secured party's failure to perfect. The losses include not only court costs, but also the time and money wasted on negotiating the original plan. These amounts may be hard to calculate with any degree of accuracy and, in any event, the calculation exercise may itself be costly, time-consuming and productive of still more litigation. 70 Moreover, in cases where the secured party's conduct forces the debtor to abandon a reorganization attempt in favour of liquidation, in principle the costs award should include, in addition to the court and transactions costs incurred by the immediate parties to the plan, the full social costs associated with the debtor's failure discounted by the chance that the reorganization may have failed anyway. 71 On the other hand, the courts may be unwilling to go this far and, in any event, identifying all the social costs is likely to prove difficult, as is determining the appropriate discount factor.
In summary, there is a strong policy argument, resting on the potential prejudice to the debtor and other creditors, for making an unperfected security interest ineffective in CCAA proceedings. The avoidance of prejudice to third parties is the theme running through OPPSA, s.20 (1) ) 226 at para.14. 71 The case for making the secured party bear the full social costs of the failed reorganization attempt rests on both fairness and efficiency grounds. From a fairness perspective, it is unacceptable to compensate some stakeholder losses, but not others. From an efficiency perspective, the secured party should bear the full social cost of its actions so that it will undertake a proper cost-benefit analysis before proceeding.
of competing perfected security interests, execution creditors and transferees of the collateral for value. United States law concedes this point and Canadian law should, too.
In fact, it is probably fair to say that the current state of the law is no more than a product of history: the PPSAs were drafted before the emergence of the rescue culture and the CCAA's ascendancy. " [the] CCAA and BIA create a complementary and interrelated scheme for dealing with the property of insolvent companies, a scheme that occupies the field and ousts the application of provincial legislation. Were it otherwise, creditors might be tempted to forego efforts to restructure a debtor company and instead put the company immediately into bankruptcy. That would not be a desirable result". In TRG, C. Campbell J. disregarded this statement on the ground that the immediate issue in Ivaco was different from the one he had to decide. 76 That may have been true, but the policy consideration the statement identifies was common to both cases.
In TRG¸ C.Campbell J. said that, "while the CCAA is a statute that permits a wide latitude for the exercise of discretion, I do not think that the discretion should be exercised to defeat the legal rights of a creditor in the position of Cisco" 77 and that "unsecured creditors should not in my view, through the mechanism of the CCAA, displace the security of another creditor simply because that security is unperfected".
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Likewise, in Brookside, Lo Vecchio J. said that, "this is not a case of a creditor trying to gain an advantage but rather simply (sic) a creditor trying to hold on to an advantage it had already negotiated". 79 These statements of sympathy for the secured creditor overlook the policy considerations identified above. They also disregard the policy behind the PPSAs as currently drafted because precisely the same statements could be made about the fate of an unperfected security interest in straight bankruptcy proceedings. The answer in the bankruptcy context is two-fold: (1) the secured party is the author of its own misfortune because it failed to perfect its security interest; and (2) in any event, the interests of the other creditors take precedence, as does the need to maintain the integrity of the registration system. The same considerations apply in the CCAA context.
(c) BIA proposals
The cases discussed in Part 2 (b), above suggest that a proposal trustee is not a trustee in bankruptcy within the meaning of the PPSAs or a person who represents the creditors within the meaning of OPPSA, s.20(1)(b). These decisions are probably right as a matter of statutory construction and they are consistent with the case law relating to CCAA proceedings and receiverships.
76 (2006) The policy considerations in relation to BIA commercial proposal proceedings are more or less the same as for CCAA proceedings: 80 (1) giving effect to an unperfected security interest in proposal proceedings may disrupt the proposal and prejudice parties who have supported the proposal on the assumption that there is no relevant security interest in play; and (2) the risk of being trumped by an unpublicized security interest may cause creditors to opt for bankruptcy instead, even though there is a reasonable chance that the proposal will succeed and, if so, the returns to creditors would be higher than in a bankruptcy. Moreover, if an unperfected security interest is ineffective in CCAA proceedings but not in relation to a BIA proposal, a party may be tempted to opt for CCAA protection even though, having regard to the debtor's circumstances and the interests of the creditors at large, a BIA proposal would be more efficient in terms of time, cost or both.
In Re Mercantile Steel Products Ltd, Anderson J. suggested that, as a matter of policy, an unperfected security interest should be effective in BIA proposal proceedings because "it would be anomalous if the debtor could improve its position through objections put forward by the trustee concerning security, of a nature such that they could not have been asserted by the debtor directly". 81 However, the case was decided twenty years before Re Giffen and Anderson J's statement is inconsistent with the reasoning in that case. It also overlooks the policy considerations outlined above.
(d) Receivers
As discussed In addition to these considerations, there is a concern that, if unperfected security interests are effective in receiverships, this may increase litigation costs by encouraging parties to make unmeritorious claims to a security interest in the hope of improving their position in the receivership proceedings. As indicated in Part 3(b), above, this is already an issue in the CCAA context and it is potentially no less of a problem in receiverships.
In summary, the reasons why an unperfected security interest should be ineffective against a court-appointed receiver are that: (1) In 1231640 Ontario Inc., the bank argued at trial that "the policy reason for requiring a secured creditor to maintain the perfection of its security interest disappears on a receivership in that the debtor is deprived of possession of its property and is not in a position to grant further security interests". 85 Ground J. rejected this submission on the basis that it was factually incorrect. However, as the foregoing discussion shows, the real policy concern is not so much that the debtor might grant further security interests following the receiver's appointment but, rather, that having different priority rules for insolvency proceedings that are functionally interchangeable encourages parties to behave opportunistically by manipulating the system in their own interests. jurisdiction to override legislation. 86 On the other hand, there may be a solution of sorts under the law as it presently stands. On application by the receiver (or the CCAA monitor or BIA proposal trustee, as the case may be), the court might lift the stay to allow a creditor acting on behalf of all the unsecured creditors to take execution proceedings against the debtor to the point of seizure. This would trigger OPPSA, s.20(1)(a)(ii) or the like provision elsewhere (an unperfected security interest is subordinate to an execution creditor) and the upshot would be to make the security interest ineffective in the insolvency proceedings against the unsecured creditors at large. 87 The problem is that the courts might not be willing to play along and, besides, the strategy would be both costly and time-consuming. Statutory intervention is preferable because it avoids the need to involve the court and the sheriff.
(e) Reform proposals
For the foregoing reasons, the current PPSA rule that an unperfected security interest is ineffective against the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy should be amended so that it applies also in CCAA proceedings, BIA commercial proposal proceedings and receiverships where the receiver is appointed by the court to administer the debtor's assets in the interests of the creditors at large. This amendment would bring the Canadian PPSAs more closely into line with Article 9 in the United States. The following is a suggested draft:
"An unperfected security interest in collateral is not effective: to secured transactions law in the bankruptcy context. 93 A related consideration is that federal law guarantees national uniformity, whereas uniformity may be harder to achieve or, at least, maintain at the state level. This is presumably the reason for having a federal 90 Assignments for the benefit of creditors appear to be obsolete and so para.(e) might not be necessary. 91 See text at nn 45-48, above. The corresponding provision in the other provinces is differently worded and would require no change. For example, SPPSA, s.35(7) provides as follows: "Where: (a) registration of a security interest: (i) lapses as a result of a failure to renew the registration; or (ii) is discharged without authorization or in error; and (b) the secured party registers the security interest not later than 30 days after the lapse or discharge; the lapse or discharge does not affect the priority status of the security interest in relation to a competing perfected security interest that, immediately prior to the lapse or discharge, had a subordinate priority position, except to the extent that the competing security interest secures advances made or contracted for after the lapse or discharge and prior to the re-registration."
Note that the provision only applies in the two cases specified in paras (a)(i) and (ii), there is a 30 day time limit on reperfection and there is no reference to competing claims which arise during the period of nonperfection. 92 See n.10, above. 93 Reduces but not avoids, because the strong arm clause gives the trustee the rights and powers of a hypothetical lien creditor at the commencement of the case. As to the rights and powers of a lien creditor relative to an unperfected security interest on the eve of bankruptcy, Article 9 governs. bankruptcy law in the first place and, if so, the federal law should address all key aspects of the subject.
The case for reform at the federal level in Canada rests on similar considerations. Furthermore, there is the risk that some or all the provinces may reject the PPSA amendments proposed above. For all these reasons, the BIA , CCAA and WURA should all be amended to incorporate a provision along the lines of the United States strong arm clause and this should be done regardless of whether the provinces decide to take action as well.
Conclusion
As presently drafted, the PPSAs state that an unperfected security interest is ineffective against a trustee in bankruptcy and also, in Ontario, a person who represents the creditors.
The cases establish that this rule does not apply in CCAA proceedings, BIA proposal proceedings or receiverships. These conclusions may be correct as a matter of statutory interpretation, but they are questionable in policy terms. As a matter of policy, the rule should apply in CCAA proceedings because: (1) the late assertion of a previously unpublicized security interest may inflict losses on the debtor and the other creditors and in some cases it may derail the debtor's reorganization efforts; (2) to avoid this risk, the debtor or the other creditors may opt for bankruptcy even though there is a reasonable chance of a successful reorganization leading to a higher return for the creditors and benefits to other stakeholders; and (3) the recognition of unperfected security interests in CCAA proceedings may promote unnecessary litigation. More or less the same considerations apply in relation to BIA commercial proposals and court-appointed receivers, with the added dimension that making an unperfected security interest ineffective in CCAA proceedings but not in BIA commercial proposals or receiverships may skew parties' choices between the types of proceedings.
In summary, as Re Giffen establishes, creditor priorities should be the same inside and outside bankruptcy to prevent parties from using the bankruptcy laws to trigger a priority flip. By the same token, creditor priorities should be the same for all types of insolvency proceedings to prevent parties from choosing between the alternatives on the basis of individual self-interest rather than the interest of the creditors collectively. This should not be taken to mean that it is unlawful or improper for creditors to use the bankruptcy and insolvency laws as a means of improving their priority position. The point is simply that law-makers should try to avoid creating such opportunities in the first place.
In the cases decided to date, the courts have struggled to come to grips with the relevant policy considerations. There is a tendency for courts to sympathize with the holder of the unperfected security interest and this blinds them to the competing interests of other parties. 94 However, even if this were not the case, the PPSAs as currently worded leave insufficient room for the courts to implement the right policy. 95 A statutory solution is required.
94 See text at nn 77-79, above. Cf PSINet (2002) 30 CBR (4 th ) 226 at para. 7, where Farley J. suggests that the PPSA reperfection provisions may need "some looking at by the Legislature" (to prevent the holder of an unperfected security interest from taking CCAA plan stakeholders by surprise with a late reregistration). This is a misdiagnosis of the problem, for the reasons discussed in Part 2(a) above, but at least it recognizes that there is a problem. 95 Subject to text at n.87, above.
